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Beyond the crisis: trust repair in an interorganizational network 
 
Abstract 
This article extends understanding of trust repair by explaining in more detail the dynamics of 
trust at the network-level. Building on organizational-level trust repair research, the article 
explains how two periods of trust repair – catharsis and catalysis – contribute to trust repair of an 
interorganizational network. In addition, the article describes how changes to network-level trust 
in an interorganizational network changes the governance form of the network making the 
interorganizational network more durable and stable. 
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Beyond the crisis: trust repair in an interorganizational network 
 
Times of crisis, of disruption or constructive change, are not 
only predictable, but desirable. They mean growth. Taking a 




Interorganizational networks are increasingly used to address societal issues that cannot be 
solved by a single organization working alone (Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007). Trust is crucial 
to successful interorganizational collaboration (Bachmann, Gillespie & Priem, 2015; Provan 
& Kenis, 2008). In this article we examine how trust repair in interorganizational networks 
unfolds following a network-level trust crisis. Building on previous organization-level trust 
repair models (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009; Pfarrer, Decelles, Smith & Taylor, 2008), we describe 
two periods of trust repair following a network-level trust crisis that change the dynamics of 
trust and the governance form of an interorganizational network.  
Trust in interorganizational collaboration has been extensively researched (Lane & 
Bachmann, 1998; Sydow, 1998) and mechanisms that maintain institution-based trust are well 
established (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011). Research has extended our knowledge of trust repair 
between interorganizational dyads (McEvily, Zaheer & Kamal, 2017; Stevens, MacDuffie & 
Helper, 2015). Prominent trust repair models provide understanding of how organizations can 
work to repair trust following a transgression (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). Kramer and Lewicki 
(2010, p. 246) ask whether trust repair can enhance trusting relations and make them ‘more 
durable and stable’. The related research questions that motivate our study are: how is trust 
repaired in an interorganizational network following a crisis, and with what effect? 
We present a case study of an interorganizational network based in an English city, which 
makes up a child protection network. Mistakes were made that led to the death of Elsa, a 
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teenager suffering from anorexia, who died despite interventions from a range of health 
professionals in primary care, mental healthcare, and acute hospital settings. We studied the 
network for nine years in total. We carried out fieldwork for a year prior to Elsa’s death, and 
for two years following her death, between 2006 and 2009. We remained in touch with the 
network for a further six years, returning to the field again for another year, following the 
coroner’s inquest into Elsa’s death, in 2015. 
 Drawing on theory from prior trust research (Bachmann et al., 2015; Gillespie & Dietz, 
2009; Pfarrer et al., 2008) and public administration literature (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003; Provan 
et al., 2007; Provan & Kenis, 2008) we present an analysis of network-level trust repair that 
extends trust repair research in two ways. First, we identify two periods of network-level trust 
repair: a period of catharsis and a subsequent a period of catalysis. Second, we show how 
these two periods of trust repair change the dynamics of trust in the network and its 
governance. Building on Bachmann et al., (2015) we show a relationship between the type of 
trust that is manifest and network governance form (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Our conclusion 
is that both trust relations and the network itself become more stable as a result of the two 
periods of trust repair (Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa & Bagherzadeh, 2015).   
 
Theoretical background 
First, we clarify how organizations trust.  Second, we explain how interorganizational networks 
have a bearing on the type of trust that exists between the organizations and the constitution of 
trust at the network level. Third, we discuss extant organization-level trust repair models and 




How do organizations trust? 
Organizations can place trust in interorganizational relationships to facilitate network-level 
collaboration (Weber & Mayer, 2011). Alternatively, organizations can place trust in the 
network to provide the necessary regulations to ensure that organizations can collaborate 
effectively (Bachmann, 2011). For analytical clarity we refer to the former as interaction-based 
trust and the latter as institution-based trust (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011).  
Institution-based trust provides apparatus for the instigation and ongoing maintenance of 
trusting relations between organizations. In routine times it may be a preferable basis for 
maintaining interorganizational trust (Bachmann, 2001; Lane & Bachmann, 1996). This is 
because formally established institutional safeguards provide clear guidelines for compliance 
by explicitly articulating standards for behaviour (Swärd, 2016; Zhou & Poppo, 2010). 
Organizations can therefore place their trust in institutional safeguards rather than investing 
valuable time and resources in establishing and maintaining many dyadic interorganizational 
relationships (Bachmann, 2011).  
Interaction-based trust foregrounds relationships between organizations as the primary 
means of managing interorganizational collaboration (Kim, Dirks & Cooper, 2009; Ren & 
Gray, 2009). The advantage of regular interaction is that it establishes a shared understanding 
amongst organizations as to how they collaborate (Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan, 2009; 
Provan & Kenis, 2008). If there is too little trust, organizations will be unwilling to invest 
further in collaboration (Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1998) and will underestimate the 
capabilities of their collaborating organizations (Gulati & Nickerson, 2008). Too much trust 
between organizations can lead to blind spots (Lumineau & Oliveira, 2018) and path 
dependencies (Möllering & Sydow, 2019) in the relationship. An ‘optimal’ level of trust 
(Stevens et al., 2015) is dependent on the type of trust in the network, the extent to which 
collaborating organizations share mutual goals and the governance form of the network.    
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Interorganizational trust and network governance forms  
Whilst serendipitously-formed interorganizational networks are opaque with respect to 
membership and relationships between the organizations (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003), purposefully 
established networks – so-called goal-directed whole networks defined ‘as a group of three or 
more organizations connected in ways that facilitate achievement of a common goal’ (Provan 
et al., 2007, p. 482) – provide an opportunity to empirically study interorganizational trust at 
network level. This is because membership of the network, its shared goals and the 
organizations’ accountabilities are made explicit.  Provan and Kenis (2008)1 suggest a 
relationship between the density of trust-ties in a whole network and its governance form, 
proposing that the dynamics of trust will differ depending on whether a network is participant 
or lead organization governed.  
Participant-led networks, where organizations share responsibility for network governance, 
will rely on a high density of trust-ties so that understanding is shared amongst network 
members as they collectively take responsibility for network-level decisions. In theory, such a 
network is likely to consist of only a small number of organizations (Provan & Lemaire, 2012). 
This is because the type of trust that forms the basis for collaboration in shared governance is 
principally interaction-based (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007) and relies on a dense web of trust-
based ties to ensure that shared values are understood in order to guide network-level decision 
making (Provan & Kenis, 2008).  
Lead organization-governed networks rely on trust coordinated by a central entity, through 
which ‘all major network-level activities and key decisions are coordinated’ (Provan & Kenis, 
2008, p. 235). Dyadic trust-ties exist between the lead organization and each of the network 
members. The purpose of the trust-ties is to ensure coordination of network members with 
                                                          
1 We note NAO governance set out in Provan and Kenis (2008) as a third governance form. Our empirical and 




regard to the network-level objectives. For lead organization governance to be effective, 
organizations’ jurisdictional responsibilities should be clearly articulated so that organizations 
are able to trust the network’s structures and protocols. This governance form relies heavily on 
institution-based trust since organizations have limited interaction directly with each other.  
How is trust repaired following a crisis?  
Since trust is context bound (Bachmann et al., 2015), the way in which organizations trust 
and the governance form of the interorganizational network will affect interorganizational 
responses to a breakdown of trust. Whilst in some cases organizations may simply be able to 
leave the network, collaborating organizations often become bound together (Möllering & 
Sydow, 2019). Thus, there is a need to understand how organizations collaborating in an 
interorganizational network can repair trust in ways that ensure that the same failures do not 
take place again.  
Models of organization-level trust repair (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009; Pfarrer et al., 2008) 
outline two phases of trust repair. First, identifying who or what is to blame for the trust 
violation and any immediate responses required; and second, ensuring that appropriate action 
is taken to punish transgressions and clarifying measures required to mitigate against 
subsequent trust violations. Gillespie and Dietz (2009, p. 137) distinguish these phases as 
‘distrust regulation’ and ‘trustworthiness demonstration’ and show that they require different 
trust repair mechanisms, an analysis of trust repair confirmed in other studies (Kim et al., 2009; 
Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). 
In these models it is assumed that a single organization is principally responsible for the 
violation of trust. However, the informal and formal arrangements that coordinate activity in 
interorganizational collaborations often blur (Long & Sitkin, 2018). Therefore, if a trust failure 
occurs at the network level, organizations may each perceive that they have fulfilled their 
jurisdictional responsibilities with respect to a trust violation. Legalistic remedies to punish an 
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individual organization following a network-level trust breakdown will prove insufficient in 
repairing trust across the network unless there is clear evidence of an organization-level 
competence-based failure (Sitkin & Roth, 1993).  
During the first phase of ‘distrust regulation’ (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009, p. 137) organizations 
seek to mitigate the risk presented by the trust crisis. They turn to ‘regulation and formal 
control’ mechanisms in an effort to repair trust (Bachmann et al., 2015, pp. 1130-1131). 
Organizations may attribute blame to the regulatory structures for the trust failure (Kim et al., 
2009). If the failure is the ‘lack of ability’ of regulations to manage behaviours and coordinate 
activities then the governance mechanisms become the focus of trust repair efforts (Gillespie, 
Hurley, Dietz & Bachmann, 2012, p. 187). Adjusting governance mechanisms has been shown 
to play a role in restoring trust in the regulations that govern interorganizational relations 
(Eberl, Geiger & Aßländer, 2015; Spicer & Okhmatovskiy, 2015). Repairing trust in the 
governance of the network provides assurances that organizations can expect positive exchange 
between organizations once again (Kim et al., 2009) and addressing control mechanisms 
represents commitment to future relations (Klein Woolthuis, Hillebrand & Nooteboom, 2002). 
 The second phase – ‘trustworthiness demonstration’ (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009, p. 137) – 
requires different trust repair strategies that show that lessons have been learned and 
acknowledge perceived failures. Research emphasizes the importance of apologizing to show 
that lessons have been learned (Lewicki & Brinsfield, 2017). An apology helps to demonstrate 
an understanding of the events that have taken place (Fehr, Gelfand & Nag, 2010) and conveys 
a ‘desire to reconcile’ relations (Tomlinson, Dineen & Lewicki, 2004, p. 169). Apologies thus 
signal a change in attitude towards trusting relations and assurance about the future (Lewicki, 
McAllister & Bies, 1998; Lewicki, Polin & Lount, 2016). Whilst research shows that the 
timeliness of an apology is crucial (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009; Haesevoets et al., 2016), an 
apology must be supported by ‘social rituals and symbolic acts’ to demonstrate that the apology 
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is sincere (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009, p. 135; Schweitzer, Hershey & Bradlow, 2006). This 
includes committing money, time and manpower to demonstrate sincerity and commitment to 
change (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009).  
Providing an apology to demonstrate trustworthiness is problematic at the network level if 
the failure is perceived to be in the governance mechanisms of the network. Organizations are 
unlikely to feel any need to apologize. Further, in the immediate aftermath of an 
interorganizational crisis, an apology can easily lead to blame being directed at the organization 
that is making the apology (Ferrin, Kim, Cooper & Dirks, 2007), or the apology may be 
perceived as ‘cheap talk’ (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002, p. 498). Responding 
to this particular challenge of trust repair at the network level and drawing on extant trust and 
network governance research, we examine an interorganizational network that encountered and 
then recovered from a network-level trust failure.  
Research context and design 
To explore the changes to the network we first reflect on the trust dynamics across the network 
prior to the crisis. Second, we reflect on the trust repair strategies adopted by organizations in 
the network in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. Third, we consider the trust repair strategy 
adopted by the lead organization after the initial crisis period. Fourth, we present data from the 
network six years after the crisis.  
Whilst maintaining the use of interaction-based and institution-based trust as two the bases 
for interorganizational trust, we draw on what Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995, p. 724) 
refer to as ‘trusting action’. A decision to trust is therefore based on perceptions of the ability, 
integrity or benevolence of the referent and the willingness of the trustor to make themselves 
vulnerable in the expectation of positive behaviour from the trustee (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & 




Our study of the City Local Safeguarding Children’s Board (the CLSCB) proved a revelatory 
longitudinal case, meeting all the necessary conditions regarding trust breakdown and repair in 
an interorganizational network with the potential to provide rich description of, and explanation 
for, our theoretical concerns (Yin, 2003).    
The CLSCB represents a goal-directed network (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003) with a lead 
organization-governance form (Provan & Kenis, 2008). The Chair is formally accountable for 
the CLSCB’s performance to the government regulatory agency. The network meets monthly 
and encompasses members from the acute hospital; the mental healthcare provider; primary 
care providers; police, fire and ambulance services; education providers; and voluntary sector 
organizations. The CLSCB’s membership over the nine ears we engaged with it remained 
stable. This is illustrated by our ability to interview the same CLSCB members more than once 
(table two).  
Trust broke down amongst members of the CLSCB following the death of Elsa who was a 
teenager suffering from chronic anorexia. Elsa had been subject to various clinical and 
therapeutic interventions from a range of health professionals in primary care, mental 
healthcare, and acute hospital settings over six years. During this period her condition 
deteriorated, with her weight plummeting to 25 kilograms, eventually leading to her premature 
death from multiple organ failure in the intensive care unit of a hospital. Following the inquest 
into her death, the coroner noted that ‘systematic weaknesses in the organization of health 
services led to Elsa’s unnecessary death’, but was satisfied that the organizations involved in 







Our case allowed us to examine the trust dynamics of the network before the crisis and well 
beyond the two episodes of trust repair that took place following the death of Elsa. We 
interviewed individuals who represented their constituent organizations and we made it clear 
to interviewees that our interest lay in their organizations’ interactions with the other network 
member organizations. A limitation of prior trust research is that it uses single informants as a 
proxy to assess interorganizational trust. Prior research relies heavily on a single informant 
from each organization such as a boundary-spanning individual (Williams, 2002) or 
partnership manager (Muthusamy & White, 2005). This means that the level of analysis is not 
clear (Currall & Inkpen, 2002). To address this, we interviewed multiple informants from the 
organizations across the network, sampled from different levels in the organizations. We 
supplemented insight from interviews with documents and observational fieldnotes to capture 
an aggregate perspective of each of the organizations in the network (see table one for summary 
of fieldwork).  
-- Insert table one about here – 
 
In total, we conducted 83 interviews with 45 interviewees over the study (see table two for 
membership of the CLSCB and interviewees). Some informants were interviewed more than 
once as we judged that they provided particularly rich insight into the changing trust 
relationships between the organizations. Interviews ranged between 45 minutes and two hours. 
In addition, over 200 hours of meeting observations were undertaken (see table two). 
Observations were documented in field journals and the interviews were recorded using digital 
equipment, before being transcribed verbatim.  
 
-- Insert table two about here – 
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Data Analysis     
Having collated documentary evidence, observations and interviews into a password protected 
case study database, we undertook our analysis. The need for authentic explanation called for 
more contextual accuracy at the expense of theoretical generality (Langley, 1999; Langley, 
Smallman, Tsoukas & Van de Ven, 2013). For this reason, in our initial coding we pursued a 
temporal bracketing strategy, anchoring the data into episodes. Our analytical strategy was 
iterative in nature as we sought to interpret the complexity of trust relations and their interaction 
with the network form over time (Langley, 1999; Langley et al., 2013). Employing abductive 
reasoning (Locke, Golden-Biddle & Feldman, 2008; Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013) we were 
driven by a focus on the theoretical problem in conjunction with the need to provide an 
explanation of the case (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007). Our abductive approach promoted 
continual dialogue between theory and empirical findings, which underpinned an analytical 
strategy based on the continuous formulation and iteration of questions and answers from 
literature to both focus and explain emerging findings (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007; Locke et 
al., 2008; Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013). 
During this temporal bracketing process, each of the authors separately engaged in a fine-
grained reading of the data, following which they formulated a narrative account of events 
preceding and following the eating disorder patient’s death. The production of a chronological 
narrative is a common first step in organizing data for further analysis and provides important 
validation as it allowed us to check our subsequent interpretations against this raw narrative 
(Langley, 1999). We then continued to examine organizational interactions and outcomes of 
their activities within the network, which allowed us to implement the temporal bracketing 
strategy and identify what were initially three episodes preceding and following Elsa’s death, 
and then subsequently a fourth episode on our return to the field.  
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These four episodes provide the structure for our empirical findings. True to the principles 
of abductive reasoning (Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013), our theoretical analysis of trust relations 
and their interaction with network form developed alongside our empirical analysis. While we 
accept that our account is one of many potential interpretations with respect to the network 
change observed (Van Maanen, 1988), we worked to ensure that we did not retrofit the data to 
service our theorizing (Wodak & Busch, 2004) in two ways. First, we considered and discussed 
several theoretical explanations, which were reflected in the different generations of data 
structures that we constructed during different stages of the research process. Using principles 
of abduction (Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013), we ruled out several theoretical explanations in 
search of the clearest explanation that best fitted the data (Mantere, 2017). In the coding 
process, we explored earlier generations of data structures built on concepts from literatures 
such as sensemaking, organizational learning and attribution theory. While all such literatures 
offered partial explanations for what had happened, changing trust relations and their effect on 
network form was found to be the clearest descriptor of the outcome. Second, we triangulated 
between data types. With unfettered access to the network granted by the Chair of the CLSCB, 
we ensured that we took advantage of opportunities to observe meetings and other events, as 
set out in table two, and to discuss our analysis of these against our interview analysis. As an 
example of our data triangulation, we interrogated the account of the Chief Executive of the 
Mental Healthcare Provider (Manny), who attributed much of the organizational change to his 
own efforts. In part, this conclusion was validated during observations, but we judged a 
stronger explanation for the response towards initiating trust repair was attributed to the 
CLSCB Chair in our observational findings. The final generation of data structures for each 
episode, elaborating the empirical and theoretical concepts that underpin our data structure, is 
presented in figure one. 




We present data from the interorganizational network members at four points: (1) prior to the 
crisis (Spring 2006 – Spring 2007); (2) in the immediate aftermath of the crisis (Spring 2007 – 
Spring 2008); (3) one year following the crisis (Summer 2008 – Winter 2009); and (4) six years 
after the crisis (Spring 2015 – Spring 2016).  
 
Episode one (Spring 2006 – Spring 2007) 
Prior to Elsa’s death, there were dyadic trust relations between the lead organization and 
constituent organizations, which ‘allowed the job of ensuring safeguarding to be done’ (Sam, 
Medical Director, Mental Healthcare Provider).  Professionals drawn from the organizations 
that made up the CLSCB ‘trusted them [the lead organization] to get on with it.  They just co-
ordinate our efforts and make sure everyone is doing what they should’ (Medina, Nurse, 
Hospital Acute Care). The lead organization, ‘ran the show. We arrange quarterly meetings, 
set the agenda, invite the relevant people along, and ask them to report back matters of concern. 
We can’t directly control what they [other organizations and professionals] do. They are not 
accountable to us’ (Lillian, Administrator, CLSCB).  
In a benign context in episode one, the operations of the CLSCB seemed routine, with the 
constituent senior professionals of the CLSCB 
Representing our organizations and reporting back to our organizations where we 
need to. For my part, there is a standing item in our Risk and Governance Sub-
Committee for safeguarding, which I report on.  
(Sam, Medical Director, Mental Healthcare Provider)  
 
Another constituent member organization in the CLSCB viewed the network  
As a sideshow to our mainstream business. I turn up at the meetings, report to 
them, go back to base, get on with things. As long as nothing goes wrong, then 
everything is fine. Nothing much has gone wrong since I have been going along, 
the odd complex case, but we have well established protocols.  




There was minimal interaction between the constituent professionals that represented their 
organizations within the CLSCB. Interactions were between the lead organization and each 
member. This was reflected in the informal interactions around the CLSCB meetings, with the 
Chair of the CLSCB commonly finding that they would 
Phone ahead of meetings to touch base. Sam [Medical Director, Mental 
Healthcare Provider], we just catch up and check everything is going smoothly, 
and he knows what he needs to do. It helps build trust between us. None of us will 
be surprised by anything raised in meetings. We deal with issues outside the 
meetings. I’m clear what I expect from them. 
(Nellie, Chair, CLSCB)  
 
As one member of the CLSCB commented, ‘if there is a problem, they [Nellie, the CLSCB 
Chair] come to us since they are the ones accountable to the regulator for performance’ (Nick, 
Medical Director, Hospital Acute Care). Nellie (Chair, CLSCB) observed that ‘the regulator 
hasn’t been too interested in us. We are performing well in terms of our safeguarding 
responsibilities against our protocols’. These comments were to prove prescient.   
Up to this point, characterized by lead organization governance, and in a benign context, the 
network appeared to be functioning effectively in line with its goal-directed mandate. We 
observed dyadic relations between the lead organization and each of the CLSCB’s constituent 
members. These dyadic relationships were characterized by institution-based trust in the 
regulations. Dyadic relations between constituent members were correspondingly latent and 
dormant, since they appeared unnecessary. Member organizations trusted the regulatory 
structure and were held to account through their dyadic relations with the lead organization that 







Episode two (Spring 2007 – Spring 2008) 
 
Following Elsa’s death in Spring 2007, trust in the network broke down. Organizations 
responded by underlining that they had adhered to the mandated rules, clarifying their own 
actions to other members of the network based on their jurisdictional accountability. Each of 
the organizations maintained that they had done everything that they could have done to 
provide an appropriate level of care as set out in protocols for addressing the condition of eating 
disorders. Doris [GP, representing the General Practice providers in the city] argued that the 
GP that cared for Elsa discharged the professional jurisdictional tasks for which they were 
accountable: ‘the GP referred the patient to the hospital when required, so did their bit properly’ 
(field note from observation of CLSCB meeting, September 2007, p. 13).  
After clarifying that they had adhered correctly to the rules, organizations involved in Elsa’s 
care questioned whether others had discharged their responsibilities as set out in protocols to 
prevent Elsa ‘falling through the cracks of care’ (Sam, Medical Director, Mental Healthcare 
Provider). There was some concern raised about the lead organization, who had been ‘trusted 
to run it [the CLSCB meeting], but do they have the professional experience to do so?’ (Jim, 
GP). The dyadic relationships between the lead organization and other organizations broke 
down in the wake of Elsa’s death and trust in the governance mechanisms broke down as 
organizations perceived they had fulfilled their responsibilities as mandated by the lead 
organization. However, somewhat counterintuitively, blame was not placed upon the lead 
organization. Such was the governance structure of the network at this point that knowledge of 
working practices across the network was limited. Network members speculated that other 
network members might be to blame. Of particular note was the blame that the two largest 
healthcare providers in the CLSCB placed on one another:   
We are not working effectively together because of the suspicion each of 
our medical directors has about the other’s motives and actions. Each feels 
they are being ‘hung out to dry’ by the other for Elsa’s death.  




Nick (Medical Director, Hospital Acute Care) blamed the mental healthcare provider for the 
failure, based upon their professional jurisdiction: ‘ultimately this is a mental health failure. 
CAMHS [Children and Adolescent’s Mental Health Service] is responsible for eating 
disorders’ (field note from observation of CLSCB meeting, September 2007). 
Nellie was ‘fully aware of the relationship breakdown across the two organizations [Mental 
Healthcare Provider and Hospital Acute Care]’ (Nellie, Chair, CLSCB), following which she 
encouraged the CEOs of the Hospital Acute Care and Mental Healthcare Provider to address 
the breakdown of trust between the two medical directors: 
I recognized it was difficult for me to reach into these particularly powerful 
players that shaped how our two most important organizations interacted. I 
needed to work through their Chief Executives, they needed to develop the 
medical relationships across their organizations, rather than both come 
through me … they agreed, I left it to them.  
(Nellie, Chair, CLSCB) 
  
The CEOs took their respective medical directors aside to ‘sort out the medical politics, which 
to be fair they did, and they put their differences aside without poisoning things amongst the 
wider group of clinicians in each of our organizations’ (Manny, CEO, Mental Healthcare 
Provider).  
At the same time, Nellie (Chair, CLSCB) also ‘wanted to focus all organizations on 
tightening up the way we worked together through our protocols and wider communication’ 
(Nellie, Chair, CLSCB), and set up a sub-committee to the CLSCB, which was given the remit 
of examining coordination amongst organizations in the network, specifically, 
To develop a better protocol that framed how a client with an eating disorder was 
cross-referred from one agency to another, and how the information about him or 
her was shared across agencies. We were particularly concerned about the health 
organizations, ensuring primary care, the GPs, the mental healthcare provider and 
hospital related better to each other in dealing with the client.  
(Louise, Manager, Local Government)  
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Within the sub-committee, medical directors worked with their colleagues in their respective 
organizations to develop an approach to repairing trust following the crisis that focused on 
clarifying how they referred to each other:  
There is now a clear protocol that sets out how we respond. If a patient comes in 
through accident and emergency, we deal immediately with the problem, say 
intravenously feeding them, checking their physical condition, stabilizing them. If 
we suspect anorexia, we inform the GP, the mental healthcare provider, and the 
safeguarding board of their admission.  
(Medina, Paediatrician, Hospital Acute Care) 
 
By Spring 2008, one year after Elsa’s death, the organizations in the network had seemingly 
addressed the failings that led to Elsa’s death by restoring trust in the network’s regulatory 
provision through reworked protocols that governed the organizations’ behaviours and by 
restabilizing the dyadic relations between constituent organizations and the lead organization 
so they could continue to work towards their mandated goal. This might have been the end of 
the story for this network, since they had ostensibly addressed the crisis by repairing trust in 
the regulatory provisions of the network.  
 
Episode three (Summer 2008 – Winter 2009) 
As we continued our fieldwork, we observed a change in the ways that the organizations 
interacted in Summer 2008. It became evident once trust in the regulatory provisions of the 
network had been restored, that the lead organization sought further assurances against another 
crisis. In episode three the lead organization facilitated interaction between the constituent 
organizations in the CLSCB, recognizing this was important for the effective functioning of 
the CLSCB in the future.  
Despite ‘feeling threatened’ during the initial period when tensions were running high 




From a hierarchical relationship between us [the lead organization] and them 
[constituent organizations of the CLSCB] to a more, what I would call collective 
relationship. Privately I took it hard to start with as my individual failing, but 
then saw it as a more collective thing. I had to bring others to the same 
conclusion that we had all failed and that we had to work together. This was not 
just a matter of tightening up our protocols, but of attending to the “softer” 
[Nellie signalled quotation marks around her use of this term], less tangible 
aspects of our relationships.  
(Nellie, Chair, CLSCB) 
 
With the aim of enhancing interorganizational relationships, Nellie called a meeting, which she 
described as an organizational development event where she ‘rallied the troops’ (Nellie, Chair, 
CLSCB, January 2009, field note from conversation with Nellie, p. 5). Nellie’s opening speech 
was ‘Churchillian in its resonance’.  She concluded that ‘we are all in this together’ (January 
2009, reflective note of organizational development event, p. 3). The ‘rousing war cry’ (January 
2009, reflective note of organizational development event, p. 3) channelled the CLSCB 
members towards their collective goal. As Nellie put it in the meeting: ‘united we stand, divided 
we fall’ (January 2009, reflective note of organizational development event, p. 3). This pivotal 
speech articulated common failures, but focused principally on the common goal amongst 
members of the network:  
If we go it alone, we just pass the problem around. The aim of the meeting today 
is to move this approach forward. I want you to learn from each other, and 
develop a shared vision for safeguarding the vulnerable children of this city. 
Together we can stop these things happening, but only together.  
(Nellie, January 2009, field note, organization development event, pp. 1-2) 
 
Nellie invoked feelings of responsibility for Elsa’s death, to channel others towards the same 
end, focusing upon the vulnerable nature of the clients, such as Elsa, whom the CLSCB served:  
I tried to deflect personalization of blame, and move debate away from our own 
failings, to imagine how safeguarding boards might work more effectively to 
deliver care to vulnerable young people.  




This had the effect of reorienting the network members’ relationships to the network’s 
priorities: ‘It’s a simple thing to focus upon. We do care. She [Nellie] just pushed us on it. We 
really do care about girls such as [Elsa]’ (Sam, Medical Director, Mental Healthcare Provider).  
Following the organizational development event, activities amongst the network members 
took several different forms, guided by Nellie. She formed a working group that fed into the 
sub-committee previously instituted in episode three, that was to ‘explicitly analyse the 
relationships across organizations in the CLSCB and make suggestions for how organizations 
could work more effectively together, rather than as just directed from above’ (Nellie, Chair, 
CLSCB). The tone had shifted from one of blame within the network to one of shared 
responsibility, recognizing their collective goal and acknowledging their collective failings, 
following which ‘they were expected to work more effectively together, not only reliant on 
protocols to do so’ (Nellie, Chair, CLSCB). Nellie continued to lead the network-level goals: 
‘we need to ensure what we want fits with managerial priorities, gets into the right arenas to 
secure resource. I’m speaking to them all individually’ (Nellie, Chair, CLSCB). During this 
period, we saw the organizations in the network begin to behave in ways that indicated 
interaction-based trust had begun to develop not just with the lead organization but between 
other organizations in the network:   
We began to feel we could do something. Nellie was encouraging us to do 
something, giving us permission to move things forward. We needed to work 
more collaboratively to do this.  
(Medina, Paediatrician, Hospital Acute Care) 
 
The working group, encouraged by Nellie to think about ‘how to structure the delivery of 
eating disorders care across the myriad of organizations involved’ (Martin, CAMHS 
Psychologist, Mental Healthcare Provider), proposed the development of a specialist eating 
disorders service to be designed and delivered collaboratively by the network members. ‘This 
represented a practical solution to engender the type of relationships across organizations 
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delivering the service to prevent future failure’ (Nellie, Chair, CLSCB). As the organizations 
worked together in establishing the eating disorders unit they began to acknowledge more 
frankly in open fora the collective failings Nellie had identified at the organizational 
development event. Clinicians in acute hospital recognized they had to work beyond their 
clinical jurisdiction: ‘We failed because we are too busy holding on to our expertise, “it’s 
someone else’s responsibility”. How did we let this happen to a vulnerable girl?’ (Medina, 
Paediatrician, Hospital Acute Care). The development of the specialist eating disorders unit 
also required organizations to commit to developing relationships beyond those mandated by 
the governance structure in order to work effectively: ‘we sought to build a better relationship 
with our colleagues in [the mental healthcare care provider], which until this point had been 
too distant, structured through protocols not through people’ (Gina, Paediatrics Nurse, Hospital 
Acute Care). This outlook was reciprocated: ‘they [clinicians from the acute health provider] 
come across here regularly, which allows us to get to know each other better, to understand 
each other more. I know what happens their end, they know what happens our end, rather than 
before, distant from each other’ (Carol, Nurse, Mental Healthcare Provider).  
As collaboration amongst network members on the development of a specialist eating 
disorders service began the organizations became more engaged collectively with the shared 
goal of the network: 
We started developing our service in terms of our own CAMHS [Children and 
Adolescent Mental Healthcare Service] configuration and then realized we needed 
input from other organizations.  
(Sam, Medical Director, Mental Healthcare Provider) 
 
Whilst it was clear that the CLSCB remained the lead organization accountable for the broader 
issue of child protection, a service delivery network developed within which constituent 
organizations began to engage directly. The mental healthcare provider and acute hospital, who 
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had previously blamed each other over the crisis for failing to discharge their respective 
responsibilities, had developed a close working relationship: 
Protocols are necessary, they really are, but they are not enough. You have to 
work closely together and build the relationship on the ground. We did this to 
develop the eating disorders service … we could rely on them, they could rely on 
us to work with them. 
(Medina, Paediatrician, Hospital Acute Care) 
 
However, at this point, the service remained incipient, described as ‘fragile, just a response to 
find a way forward, but we needed to sustain our relationships’ (Manny, CEO, Mental 
Healthcare Provider). We highlight how the ongoing efforts to develop the eating disorders 
unit sustained the relationships across the network and impacted the network form in episode 
four. 
Episode four (Spring 2015 – Spring 2016) 
Following the publication of the coroner’s inquest into Elsa’s death, we returned to the field 
site again between Spring 2015 and Spring 2016 to examine how the eating disorders service 
had developed. Our motivation was to examine not just the relationship between the lead 
organization and others, but also how relationships between organizations within the network 
had sustained and developed. We observed a change in the network governance as trust 
relations had continued to develop between the constituent network members.  
    Despite the optimism surrounding the development of a new eating disorders service in 2009 
we suspected that there would be challenges to sustaining the momentum of activity. We 
reflected on how the trust repair efforts that took place in episodes two and three had impacted 
the relationships between the organizations in the network in the longer term. When we 
returned, institution-based trust had been repaired, even enhanced, through 
Not just protocols for how we co-ordinate our actions, but a set of criteria that we 
have developed to satisfy the CLSCB Chair about our performance on the ground 
and that are likely to mitigate against future failure. They make sense in relation to 
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how we deliver services across organizations. At the same time, they allow the chair 
clear sight of our activities for managerial purposes. 
(Martin, CAMHS Psychologist, Mental Healthcare Provider)   
 
However, new interaction-based trust was also now evident. We observed how trust between 
network members was manifest in three types of behaviour within the network that had not 
been observed prior to the crisis. 
First, we observed that although the organizational membership of the network remained 
the same, and the interorganizational network remained goal-orientated, the relationships 
amongst the organizations had shifted away from the reliance solely on dyadic relations with 
the lead organization observed in episode one. Nick, (Medical Director, Acute Hospital) 
commented that the Mental Healthcare Provider ‘holds the ring for us into which we all work, 
the area of eating disorders’. This comment from the Medical Director of the Hospital Acute 
Care was of particular note. The two medical directors who previously levelled blame at each 
other’s organizations for the failures in the immediate aftermath of crisis were now working 
closely together towards the common goal of the network. This was emblematic of the fact that 
the dyadic interaction-based trust relations we observed developing in episode three had 
sustained. This was reflected in other dyadic relations. Mona (Health Visitor, Primary Care) 
reflected, ‘I feel I know what they [Mental Healthcare Provider] need from me. I can get on 
with actually doing my job and have an understanding of how they do theirs’.  
Second, the organizations continued to engage directly with one another in the ongoing 
delivery of the eating disorders unit and did not just rely on the regulatory governance of the 
network in delivering the service: ‘we were no longer a dangerous service, we became tight 
knit, holding each other responsible for what we delivered as a team’ (Linda, Psychiatrist, 
CAMHS, Clinical Lead). These relationships went beyond the jurisdictional accountabilities 
mandated by the CLSCB. For instance, David (Lead Paediatrician, Hospital Acute Care) liaised 
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closely with the service delivery team located in the Mental Healthcare Provider, reflecting on 
the benefits of the trust that now existed between the two members of the network: 
Young people [with eating disorders] are probably more likely to turn up here 
[Hospital Acute Care] than there [Mental Healthcare Provider], but I need to cross 
refer to them, previously difficult, but now facilitated by a specialist service to 
whom I can directly relate. I am much more prepared to address underlying 
issues, rather than patch them up and send them on. It is less a matter of 
coordination and more a matter of having a relationship with the Mental 
Healthcare Provider.  
 
Third, through their collaboration on the development of the eating disorders unit the 
organizations had become engaged with the governance of the network rather than simply 
adhering to their individual jurisdictional responsibilities within the CLSCB. One member 
observed, ‘I am much more proactively looking for young people with eating disorders in my 
clinic so that we don’t experience missed opportunities [for care], that’s service failure, and we 
are not a failing network’ (Jim, GP). Even Nick (Medical Director, Hospital Acute Care), who 
previously blamed others for failure, contributed towards network governance:  
I used to attend network meetings sporadically, it was a sideshow, I would 
delegate others to represent the organization. Now I attend and contribute fully. 
We, me, are part of the network. It’s not a sideshow anymore. 
 
Therefore, rather than viewing the network’s regulations as the sole basis for trusting relations, 
organizations were also relationally engaged with their collaborators and the priorities of the 
network. Episode four shows that the nascent dyadic trusting relations between constituent 
organizations observed in episode three had sustained. The consequence of this is that trusting 
relations amongst the network were now more distributed. Institution-based and interaction-
based trusting relations now exist in the network. This is in contrast to trusting relations in 
episode one where the lead organization-governance form relies principally on institution-




Figure two presents a model that sets out changes in the network and associated trust repair 
strategies. We first discuss the changes to network-level trust and governance form. Second, 
we distinguish the two periods of trust repair (catharsis and catalysis) and clarify how they 
bring change to network-level trust and governance form. Third, we reflect on whether the new 
network form is ‘more durable and stable’ (Kramer & Lewicki, 2010, p. 268), and whether 
stability is always beneficial (Majchrzak et al., 2015). We conclude by clarifying some of the 
boundary conditions, limitations and avenues for future research.  
-- Insert figure two about here – 
Changes to network-level trust and governance form 
Prior to the breakdown of trust (episode one), organizations placed trust in the network’s 
governance mechanisms. This was facilitated by a lead organization that ensured each 
organization was clear what their responsibilities were. At this point institution-based trust 
provided the basis for network trust (Bachmann, 2001). Thus, centrally managed governance 
with organizations placing institution-based trust in the network structures is shown to be an 
effective way to facilitate interorganizational collaboration in routine circumstances. 
On our return to the field in 2015 (episode four), the network remained formally lead 
organization governed; organizations continued to rely on institution-based trust to ensure 
effective collaboration across the network. However, dyadic trust relations between network 
members were now established. The new dyadic relationships between network members had 
come to form a dense web of interaction-based trust-ties between organizations that gave the 
network characteristics of a participant-governed network, whilst retaining characteristics of 
lead organization governance (Provan & Kenis, 2008). The following section examines how 




Network-level trust repair 
 
Episodes two and three show two phases of trust repair underpinned by different trust repair 
mechanisms that bring change to network-level trust. The first phase of trust repair is a period 
of catharsis where trusting relations are restored to their previous state (episode two). The 
second phase of trust repair is a period of catalysis which brings change to the trusting relations 
(episode three).   
 
Trust repair as catharsis. Each organization believed it had discharged its jurisdictional duties 
and complied with the mandated rules of the network with respect to the failures surrounding 
Elsa’s death. Organization-level trust repair models indicate that acknowledging the incident 
and taking active steps to understand the reasons why the incident took place would be the 
effective course of action to repair trust between the stakeholders (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009; 
Pfarrer et al., 2008). However, the lead organization does not pursue this in the first instance. 
Instead, a period of catharsis unfolds, in which organizations blame one another.  
Given the lead organization’s central role in the governance of the network it seems puzzling 
that they are not scapegoated for the crisis (Gangloff et al., 2016). This is because the lead 
organization has dyadic relationships with each organization, yet dyadic relations between the 
other network organizations are not present at this stage. The network structure at this point is 
such that organizations do not have all the information regarding the failings (Pfarrer et al., 
2008). Therefore, in line with Kim et al. (2009), we see that organizations assign blame where 
they have limited information about other organizations to ensure they are not the focus of 
blame. Contrary to Gillespie and Dietz (2009) the lead organization chooses not to publicly 
express regret or assign blame at this point, instead allowing network organizations to establish 
their own accounts of events (Elsbach, 2003).  
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Current theory would suggest that expedient examination of the institutional arrangements 
that govern the network would be prudent. However, efforts to make changes to the regulatory 
structures are not immediate. The lead organization instigates this after the period of 
organization-level blame has taken place. The lead organization’s timing again provides insight 
into how to navigate trust repair in interorganizational networks. The constituent organizations 
have reflected upon who is to blame for the failure and assigned blame to other organizations 
in the network. However, assigning blame to other organizations has not restored trust in the 
network. The lead organization is then able offer an alternative account, which focuses on the 
governance structure of the network. Since the focus thus far has been on assigning blame to 
other organizations, the lead organization is able to facilitate the restoration of trust in the 
network by refocusing repair efforts on the governance mechanisms (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). 
This moves the organizations beyond blaming one another and towards repair of the institution-
based trust that organizations placed in the network governance. 
The organizations re-examine protocols and address perceived inadequacies of the 
governance mechanisms (Kim et al., 2009). This restores the social equilibrium and 
organizations are able to return to their previous arrangement where institution-based trust is 
placed in the governance of the network. Dyadic relations between the lead organization and 
each of the network members resume to ensure that the new rules are adhered to. Trust has 
therefore been restored to its previous state (Bachmann et al., 2015). Adjusting regulations can 
effectively restore interorganizational trust.  
Trust repair as catalysis. The second phase of trust repair is initiated by the lead organization 
and catalyses change in the behaviour of the other organizations in the network. The changes 
to behaviour bring about new dyadic trusting relations between network members. As the 
organizations’ behaviour and relationships change, their disposition towards network 
objectives is shown to change.  
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The trust repair strategy pursued by the lead organization starts with a non-apology for the 
failures. The non-apology is successful in persuading the organizations that the future will be 
better. Contrary to suggestions by Gillespie et al. (2014), the lead organization does not 
acknowledge culpability for the failings. Instead, the non-apology emphasizes the collective 
responsibility of the organizations in the network to avoid another failure. In doing so the non-
apology does not dismiss the past; rather, there is a call for the organizations to respond to the 
past by collectively addressing the failings.   
Despite not acknowledging culpability for the failings, the lead organization’s non-apology 
is perceived to be a sincere effort to repair trust (Tomlinson et al., 2004; Schweitzer et al., 
2006). This is for two reasons. First, any apology appears unnecessary at this stage; the network 
has recovered from the crisis and institutional trust has been restored in the governance 
mechanisms of the network. Therefore, choosing to be vulnerable at this point involves 
exposing the organization to unnecessary risk; the lead organization could be subject to 
retrospective blame which could lead to ‘a changing of the guard’ (Gillespie et al., 2014, p. 
371). Second, the non-apology shows that the lead organization recognizes that simply 
restoring institution-based trust has left the network susceptible to repeating previous mistakes. 
Thus, the non-apology signals commitment to further change (Lewicki et al., 2016).   
The non-apology catalyses change first by changing the attitudes of the organizations 
towards their collaborating partners (Mayer et al., 1995; Lewicki et al., 1998). Clearly 
articulating the organizations’ shared values by reminding them of their collective 
responsibility leads to the organizations changing their disposition such that they too make 
themselves vulnerable. In this sense, the lead organization has taken the first ‘leap of faith’ 
(Möllering, 2006, p. 105) and shown a willingness to be vulnerable. The organizations also 
become more expectant of positive behaviour because the apology signals a fresh start and 
renews hope about the future (Lewicki et al., 1998).  
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Furthermore, confirming arguments by Gillespie and Dietz (2009) and Tomlinson and 
Mayer (2009), the non-apology is effective because it is supported by practical action to address 
the failures, thus demonstrating that the apology is not ‘cheap talk’ (Bottom et al., 2002, p. 
498). The practical solution becomes a collaborative endeavour and performance measures that 
align with the common values of the organizations are devised. The practical solution is 
resourced such that it adequately operationalizes the vision for change. This confirms the need 
for commitment of time and resources for effective trust repair (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). 
 The non-apology serves as a catalyst for independent dyadic relationships to develop 
between the network members as they work together on the shared solution. Working together 
in this way increases the density of trust-ties in the network. The interaction-based trust is more 
than simply a collection of trusting dyadic relations; these relations are aligned with the 
collective goals of the network (Provan & Kenis, 2008).   
 
Is network-level trust more durable and stable? 
After the two periods of trust repair there are new interaction-based trust-ties amongst the 
organizations in the network. The new interaction-based trust informs, but does not supplant, 
the institution-based trust in the governance of the network. Interaction-based trust-ties are 
therefore an addition to, rather than a replacement for, the institution-based trust placed in the 
network observed before the crisis. Therefore, following the two periods of trust repair, 
network trust appears more ‘durable and stable’ (Kramer & Lewicki, 2010, p. 268). 
Further, the new dyadic trusting relations bring about change to the governance form of the 
network. The new governance form no longer conforms to either of the pure forms described 
by Provan and Kenis (2008), which we outlined earlier, showing that in practice networks may 
exist with a hybrid form of governance (Keast, 2016). The new governance form benefits from 
a shared sense of responsibility amongst organizations for network-level outcomes (typical of 
participant-governed networks) whilst retaining the benefits of clearly articulated protocols and 
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centrally mandated goals (typical of lead organization governance). Thus, the new trust 
dynamics brought about by the two periods of trust repair have made the network itself more 
stable.  
Returning to Majchrzak et al.'s (2015) question as to whether stability in a network is 
beneficial to interorganizational collaboration our findings indicate that where organizations 
are required to work towards a specific goal, stability is beneficial in line with Provan and 
Milward (1995). A governance form that reflects institution-based and interaction-based trust 
is thus one way to provide this stability.  
Provan and Kenis (2008) outline that the network governance form should reflect its 
objectives. The network dynamics we describe suggest stability is not always beneficial if, as 
Majchrzak et al. (2015) indicate, stability may stymie innovation, or, as Provan and Kenis 
(2008) hypothesize, make the network less flexible. This aligns with other trust research that 
suggests too much trust may expose organizations to the problem of possible ‘trust lock-ins’ 
making them susceptible to path dependencies (Möllering & Sydow, 2019, p. 142). Therefore, 
stable trust relations and the hybrid governance form we have outlined may have unintended 
consequences for network-level trust beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
Conclusion  
Our study addresses the research question, how is trust repaired in an interorganizational 
network following crisis, and with what effect? We provide an analysis of network-level trust 
repair to advance theory on trust repair. The two phases of trust repair revealed in our study 
show trust repair as both catharsis and catalysis. Together they contribute to the stability of 
network trust and change its governance form. As Dostoevsky alludes, continuing trust repair 
efforts beyond the crisis and ‘taking a new step’ can change the constitution of the 
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interorganizational network making network trust more durable and stable. Whether this is 
beneficial is context bound; the governance form should reflect its objectives.  
The model extends current organization-level trust repair theory (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009; 
Pfarrer et al., 2008) to provide a network perspective of the dynamics of interorganizational 
trust repair. Building on Bachmann et al. (2015) we show that both institution and interaction-
based trust repair efforts play a role in restoring network-level trust. We show the repair efforts 
bring change to the type of trust that is manifest at the network level. This changes the network 
governance form (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Our conclusion is that, as a result of the two periods 
of trust repair, trust relations and the network itself become more stable (Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa 
& Bagherzadeh, 2015). 
In reflecting upon the limitations of our study and prospects for future research, we 
recognize our analysis is developed using findings from a lead organization-governed network. 
Our analysis is generalizable to interorganizational networks that must continue to work 
together, where there is a lead organization present and where organizations share similar 
objectives. Such networks are increasingly used to address issues critical to society such as  
social care and disaster management, or managing vital public sector services (Graddy & Chen, 
2006; Vasavada, 2013; Keast, Mandell, Brown & Woolcock, 2004).  
The role of the lead organization in the network requires further clarification. Research may 
provide theoretical insight by addressing more general questions regarding the interplay 
between levels in the trust repair process (Bachmann et al., 2015). Specifically, others may 
interrogate whether the network governance form meant that the lead organization was in this 
particular case uniquely placed to traverse the two phases of trust repair without becoming the 
object of blame. This poses the question, could another organization in the network have 
catalysed change by making themselves vulnerable in the ways we outline here? Answering 
 
 31 
this question would require further consideration of the organization-level perception of risk, 
and what might motivate an organization to believe that the risk is worth taking if they must 
continue to work together. This raises a further question, could – or rather, in what 
circumstances would – an organization in a participant-led network take on a similar role to the 
lead organization?  
Reflecting more broadly on participant-led governance provokes questions about the fluidity 
of the order of the trust repair phases in the model. If, as Provan and Kenis (2008) suggest, 
there are a large number of dyadic, interaction-based trust-ties in a participant-governed 
network, would the order of the trust repair phases be different if such a network faced a similar 
trust crisis? Put another way, does catharsis necessarily come before catalysis in a network that 
does not rely principally on institution-based trust?   
In theory the sequencing of the two phases (first catharsis and then catalysis) could reverse, 
for example, where informal networks are faced with a crisis and come to realize the need for 
clearer governance arrangements. Likewise, it may be that in other contexts it is beneficial to 
have just a brief period of catharsis, for instance, in highly regulated sectors where innovation 
is required, such as the financial services sector. On the other hand, certain cultural factors may 
require a longer period of catharsis. For example, Chinese business networks have been shown 
to emphasize the importance of regular interactions and relationships (Ferrin & Gillespie, 
2010). 
Whilst our case confirms that network-level trust is context bound (Bachmann et al., 2015), 
it also highlights the need to consider trust repair as an opportunity for constructive change. As 
Dostoevsky suggests, such a perspective may illicit fear, but embracing times of crisis as an 
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Figure two   
Model of interorganizational trust repair following a crisis 
 
  
